This week at work was beyond nuts. Rolling out a new product at the end of the month. That's fine, but they pulled our schedule in twice on one day. Some Veep I'll never meet fell in love with a color for the cover that takes extra time to dry. Let's make Hammer work all weekend so we can get that special color of blue.
What happened while I was doing what I do? The Badgers beat Iowa in basketball. Lord knows I'm a homer who doesn't watch much ACC ball, but I believe that Alando Tucker would be the best college player in the country if he was 3 inches taller. The second half score was Iowa 18, Tucker 17. Fortunately for Wisconsin, they let the rest of the Badgers count their points, too. This will sadden D, but not as much as this CRS report (PDF -- if Adobe's bloatware was half as responsive as Evince, I wouldn't bother mentioning the document's format) which he kindly pointed out:
From the foregoing analysis, it appears unlikely that a court would hold that Congress has expressly or impliedly authorized the NSA electronic surveillance operations here under discussion, and it would likewise appear that, to the extent that those surveillances fall within the definition of “electronic surveillance” within the meaning of FISA or any activity regulated under Title III, Congress intended to cover the entire field with these statutes. To the extent that the NSA activity is not permitted by some reading of Title III or FISA, it may represent an exercise of presidential power at its lowest ebb, in which case exclusive presidential control is sustainable only by “disabling Congress from acting upon the subject.”141 While courts have generally accepted that the President has the power to conduct domestic electronic surveillance within the United States inside the constraints of the Fourth Amendment, no court has held squarely that the Constitution disables the Congress from endeavoring to set limits on that power. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has stated that Congress does indeed have power to regulate domestic surveillance,142 and has not ruled on the extent to which Congress can act with respect to electronic surveillance to collect foreign intelligence information. Given such uncertainty, the Administration’s legal justification, as presented in the summary analysis from the Office of Legislative Affairs, does not seem to be as well-grounded as the tenor of that letter suggests.